The
Beltway Bandit Behind the Healthcare.gov Debacle
By Phil Mattera, Dirt
Diggers Digest
A
January 2011 article in
Canada’s Globe and Mail was headlined “CGI Spies Opportunity in
Obama’s Call for Efficiency.” A new story in
the same newspaper about the same company has the title “Canadian IT Firm at
Centre of Obamacare Foul-Up Furor.”
U.S.
critics of the Affordable Care Act are depicting the widespread computer
problems that have accompanied the launch of the ACA’s online healthcare
exchanges as a major government failure. To be more precise, it is a failure of
government contracting. And the contractor at the center of the
mess is CGI Group, a Canadian outsourcing corporation that is little known
outside information technology circles.
The
glitches in the ACA rollout are shining an unfavorable light on the widespread
practice by governments at all levels of contracting out information technology
to the private sector.
The Washington
Post just published a front-page story reporting
that the federal government, which spends some $80 billion a year on outside IT
services, ends up purchasing “outdated, costly and buggy technology.” This may
be an indication of cluelessness on the part of federal IT procurement
officials, but it is also a sign that the private sector is all too willing to
take taxpayer dollars for inferior products.
It
is not yet clear whether CGI tried to use sub-standard technology for
Healthcare.gov or whether it just failed to meet the challenges of creating a
complex new system. The company and the feds are saying little about the
reasons for the glitches, preferring to issue assurances that everything will
soon be running smoothly.
The Post notes that
“Federal officials have not yet explained why CGI was given the contract or why
it was awarded on a sole-source basis.” They might also want to explain why the
contract was given to a company linked to some earlier contracting scandals.
CGI
has built its U.S. operation in large part by acquiring existing federal
contractors. One of those was Stanley Inc., which it purchased in 2010 for
about $900 million. Two years earlier, Stanley found itself under fire when it
was reported that
some of its employees working on a contract with the U.S. State Department had
improperly looked as the passport records of several Presidential candidates,
including Barack Obama.
Stanley
was also involved in a controversy over
its labor practices at the 400-worker processing center of the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services in St. Albans, Vermont. As it was about to assume
control over the facility, which handles citizenship applications, Stanley
announced that it would change job classifications at the facility, resulting
in a pay decrease of about 12 percent for up to half the workers. Vermont Sen.
Bernie Sanders called on the Labor Department to investigate what he charged
was a violation of the Service Contract Act.
Stanley’s
move also prompted a union organizing drive by the United Electrical workers.
UE official Chris Townsend told me at
the time that Stanley was employing a variety of union-busting tactics—from
hiring the union-avoidance law firm Seyfarth Shaw to forcing workers to watch
propaganda videos.
Townsend
said workers were held in captive-audience meetings for up to one-quarter of
their shifts in the period leading up to the elections—this at a time when the
backlog of citizenship applications was a serious problem.
Despite
these obstacles, UE managed to win representation elections covering most of
the workers. In 2011 the U.S. Department of Labor announced
that Stanley (by then owned by CGI) and several subcontractors would pay nearly
$2.9 million in back wages for workers who had been misclassified.
CGI
itself has also had its share of scandals, including a 2007 furor
over a C$400 million contract it received from the Canadian government at a
time when the Public Works Minister was Michael Fortier, who had been an
investment banker for CGI during his time working for Credit Suisse.
A
2010 report by
the Hawaii State Auditor found that what was supposed to be a five-year
contract awarded in 1999 by the state department of taxation to a company later
purchased by CGI had been repeatedly extended through non-competitive awards,
costing the state far more than originally planned.
The
federal government long ago chose to depend on contractors for its vast
information technology needs. That decision periodically results in debacles
like those surrounding the rollout of the ACA exchanges. It remains to be seen
whether fiascoes will also mar the actual insurance coverage being provided
through the ACA, which also relies on the supposedly efficient private sector.