By Robert
Reich
For the past quarter-century I’ve offered in articles, books, and lectures an explanation for why average working people in advanced nations like the United States have failed to gain ground and are under increasing economic stress: Put simply, globalization and technological change have made most of us less competitive.
The tasks we used to do can now be done more cheaply by lower-paid workers abroad or by computer-driven machines.
My solution—and I’m hardly alone in suggesting this—has been an
activist government that raises taxes on the wealthy, invests the proceeds in
excellent schools and other means people need to become more productive, and
redistributes to the needy.
These recommendations have been vigorously opposed by those who believe the economy will function better for everyone if government is smaller and if taxes and redistributions are curtailed.
These recommendations have been vigorously opposed by those who believe the economy will function better for everyone if government is smaller and if taxes and redistributions are curtailed.
While the explanation I offered a quarter-century ago for what
has happened is still relevant—indeed, it has become the standard, widely
accepted explanation—I’ve come to believe it overlooks a critically important
phenomenon: the increasing concentration of political power in a corporate and
financial elite that has been able to influence the rules by which the economy
runs.
And the governmental solutions I have propounded, while I believe them still useful, are in some ways beside the point because they take insufficient account of the government’s more basic role in setting the rules of the economic game.
And the governmental solutions I have propounded, while I believe them still useful, are in some ways beside the point because they take insufficient account of the government’s more basic role in setting the rules of the economic game.
Worse yet, the ensuing debate over the merits of the “free
market” versus an activist government has diverted attention from how the
market has come to be organized differently from the way it was a half-century
ago, why its current organization is failing to deliver the widely shared
prosperity it delivered then, and what the basic rules of the market should be.
It has allowed America to cling to the meritocratic tautology that individuals are paid what they’re “worth” in the market, without examining the legal and political institutions that define the market.
The tautology is easily confused for a moral claim that people deserve what they are paid. Yet this claim has meaning only if the legal and political institutions defining the market are morally justifiable.
It has allowed America to cling to the meritocratic tautology that individuals are paid what they’re “worth” in the market, without examining the legal and political institutions that define the market.
The tautology is easily confused for a moral claim that people deserve what they are paid. Yet this claim has meaning only if the legal and political institutions defining the market are morally justifiable.
II
Most fundamentally, the standard explanation for what has
happened ignores power. As such, it lures the unsuspecting into thinking
nothing can or should be done to alter what people are paid because the market
has decreed it.
The standard explanation has allowed some to argue, for example,
that the median wage of the bottom 90 percent—which for the first 30 years
after World War II rose in tandem with productivity—has stagnated for the last
30 years, even as productivity has continued to rise, because middle-income
workers are worth less than they were before new software technologies and
globalization made many of their old jobs redundant.
They therefore have to settle for lower wages and less security. If they want better jobs, they need more education and better skills. So hath the market decreed.
They therefore have to settle for lower wages and less security. If they want better jobs, they need more education and better skills. So hath the market decreed.
Yet this market view cannot be the whole story because it fails
to account for much of what we have experienced. For one thing, it doesn’t
clarify why the transformation occurred so suddenly. The divergence between
productivity gains and the median wage began in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
and then took off. Yet globalization and technological change did not suddenly
arrive at America’s doorstep in those years. What else began happening then?
Nor can the standard explanation account for why other advanced
economies facing similar forces of globalization and technological change did
not succumb to them as readily as the United States.
By 2011, the median income in Germany, for example, was rising faster than it was in the United States, and Germany’s richest 1 percent took home about 11 percent of total income, before taxes, while America’s richest 1 percent took home more than 17 percent. Why have globalization and technological change widened inequality in the United States to a much greater degree?
By 2011, the median income in Germany, for example, was rising faster than it was in the United States, and Germany’s richest 1 percent took home about 11 percent of total income, before taxes, while America’s richest 1 percent took home more than 17 percent. Why have globalization and technological change widened inequality in the United States to a much greater degree?
Nor can the standard explanation account for why the
compensation packages of the top executives of big companies soared from an
average of 20 times that of the typical worker 40 years ago to almost 300
times.
Or why the denizens of Wall Street, who in the 1950s and 1960s earned comparatively modest sums, are now paid tens or hundreds of millions annually. Are they really “worth” that much more now than they were worth then?
Or why the denizens of Wall Street, who in the 1950s and 1960s earned comparatively modest sums, are now paid tens or hundreds of millions annually. Are they really “worth” that much more now than they were worth then?
Finally and perhaps most significantly, the market explanation
cannot account for the decline in wages of recent college graduates. If the
market explanation were accurate, college graduates would command higher wages
in line with their greater productivity. After all, a college education was
supposed to boost personal incomes and maintain American prosperity.
To be sure, young people with college degrees have continued to
do better than people without them. In 2013, Americans with four-year college
degrees earned 98 percent more per hour on average than people without a
college degree. That was a bigger advantage than the 89 percent premium that
college graduates earned relative to non-graduates five years before, and the
64 percent advantage they held in the early 1980s.
But since 2000, the real average hourly wages of young college
graduates have dropped. The entry-level wages of female college graduates have
dropped by more than 8 percent, and male graduates by more than 6.5 percent. To
state it another way, while a college education has become a prerequisite for
joining the middle class, it is no longer a sure means for gaining ground once
admitted to it.
That’s largely because the middle class’s share of the total
economic pie continues to shrink, while the share going to the top continues to
grow.
III
A deeper understanding of what has happened to American incomes
over the last 25 years requires an examination of changes in the organization
of the market. These changes stem from a dramatic increase in the political
power of large corporations and Wall Street to change the rules of the market
in ways that have enhanced their profitability, while reducing the share of
economic gains going to the majority of Americans.
This transformation has amounted to a redistribution upward, but
not as “redistribution” is normally defined. The government did not tax the
middle class and poor and transfer a portion of their incomes to the rich. The
government undertook the upward redistribution by altering the rules of the
game.
Intellectual property rights—patents, trademarks, and
copyrights—have been enlarged and extended, for example.
This has created windfalls for pharmaceuticals, high tech, biotechnology, and many entertainment companies, which now preserve their monopolies longer than ever. It has also meant high prices for average consumers, including the highest pharmaceutical costs of any advanced nation.
This has created windfalls for pharmaceuticals, high tech, biotechnology, and many entertainment companies, which now preserve their monopolies longer than ever. It has also meant high prices for average consumers, including the highest pharmaceutical costs of any advanced nation.
At the same time, antitrust laws have been relaxed for
corporations with significant market power. This has meant large profits for
Monsanto, which sets the prices for most of the nation’s seed corn; for a
handful of companies with significant market power over network portals and
platforms (Amazon, Facebook, and Google); for cable companies facing little or
no broadband competition (Comcast, Time Warner, AT&T, Verizon); and for the
largest Wall Street banks, among others. And as with intellectual property
rights, this market power has simultaneously raised prices and reduced services
available to average Americans. (Americans have the most expensive and slowest
broadband of any industrialized nation, for example.)
Financial laws and regulations instituted in the wake of the
Great Crash of 1929 and the consequential Great Depression have been
abandoned—restrictions on interstate banking, on the intermingling of
investment and commercial banking, and on banks becoming publicly held
corporations, for example—thereby allowing the largest Wall Street banks to
acquire unprecedented influence over the economy.
The growth of the financial sector, in turn, spawned junk-bond financing, unfriendly takeovers, private equity and “activist” investing, and the notion that corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder value.
The growth of the financial sector, in turn, spawned junk-bond financing, unfriendly takeovers, private equity and “activist” investing, and the notion that corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder value.
Bankruptcy laws have been loosened for large
corporations—notably airlines and automobile manufacturers—allowing them to
abrogate labor contracts, threaten closures unless they receive wage
concessions, and leave workers and communities stranded. Notably, bankruptcy
has not been extended to homeowners who are burdened by mortgage debt and owe
more on their homes than the homes are worth, or to graduates laden with
student debt.
Meanwhile, the largest banks and auto manufacturers were bailed out in the downturn of 2008–2009. The result has been to shift the risks of economic failure onto the backs of average working people and taxpayers.
Meanwhile, the largest banks and auto manufacturers were bailed out in the downturn of 2008–2009. The result has been to shift the risks of economic failure onto the backs of average working people and taxpayers.
Contract laws have been altered to require mandatory arbitration
before private judges selected by big corporations. Securities laws have been
relaxed to allow insider trading of confidential information. CEOs have used
stock buybacks to boost share prices when they cash in their own stock options.
Tax laws have created loopholes for the partners of hedge funds and
private-equity funds, special favors for the oil and gas industry, lower
marginal income-tax rates on the highest incomes, and reduced estate taxes on
great wealth.
All these instances represent distributions upward—toward big
corporations and financial firms, and their executives and shareholders—and
away from average working people.
IV
Meanwhile, corporate executives and Wall Street managers and traders have done everything possible to prevent the wages of most workers from rising in tandem with productivity gains, in order that more of the gains go instead toward corporate profits. Higher corporate profits have meant higher returns for shareholders and, directly and indirectly, for the executives and bankers themselves.
Workers worried about keeping their jobs have been compelled to
accept this transformation without fully understanding its political roots. For
example, some of their economic insecurity has been the direct consequence of
trade agreements that have encouraged American companies to outsource jobs
abroad. Since all nations’ markets reflect political decisions about how they
are organized, so-called “free trade” agreements entail complex negotiations
about how different market systems are to be integrated.
The most important aspects of such negotiations concern intellectual property, financial assets, and labor. The first two of these interests have gained stronger protection in such agreements, at the insistence of big U.S. corporations and Wall Street. The latter—the interests of average working Americans in protecting the value of their labor—have gained less protection, because the voices of working people have been muted.
The most important aspects of such negotiations concern intellectual property, financial assets, and labor. The first two of these interests have gained stronger protection in such agreements, at the insistence of big U.S. corporations and Wall Street. The latter—the interests of average working Americans in protecting the value of their labor—have gained less protection, because the voices of working people have been muted.
Rising job insecurity can also be traced to high levels of
unemployment. Here, too, government policies have played a significant role.
The Great Recession, whose proximate causes were the bursting of housing and
debt bubbles brought on by the deregulation of Wall Street, hurled millions of
Americans out of work.
Then, starting in 2010, Congress opted for austerity because it was more interested in reducing budget deficits than in stimulating the economy and reducing unemployment. The resulting joblessness undermined the bargaining power of average workers and translated into stagnant or declining wages.
Then, starting in 2010, Congress opted for austerity because it was more interested in reducing budget deficits than in stimulating the economy and reducing unemployment. The resulting joblessness undermined the bargaining power of average workers and translated into stagnant or declining wages.
Some insecurity has been the result of shredded safety nets and
disappearing labor protections. Public policies that emerged during the New
Deal and World War II had placed most economic risks squarely on large
corporations through strong employment contracts, along with Social Security,
workers’ compensation, 40-hour workweeks with time-and-a-half for overtime, and
employer-provided health benefits (wartime price controls encouraged such
tax-free benefits as substitutes for wage increases).
But in the wake of the junk-bond and takeover mania of the 1980s, economic risks were shifted to workers. Corporate executives did whatever they could to reduce payrolls—outsource abroad, install labor-replacing technologies, and utilize part-time and contract workers. A new set of laws and regulations facilitated this transformation.
But in the wake of the junk-bond and takeover mania of the 1980s, economic risks were shifted to workers. Corporate executives did whatever they could to reduce payrolls—outsource abroad, install labor-replacing technologies, and utilize part-time and contract workers. A new set of laws and regulations facilitated this transformation.
As a result, economic insecurity became baked into employment.
Full-time workers who had put in decades with a company often found themselves
without a job overnight—with no severance pay, no help finding another job, and
no health insurance. Even before the crash of 2008, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics at the University of Michigan found that over any given two-year
stretch in the two preceding decades, about half of all families experienced
some decline in income.
Today, nearly one out of every five working Americans is in a
part-time job. Many are consultants, freelancers, and independent
contractors. Two-thirds are living paycheck to paycheck. And employment
benefits have shriveled. The portion of workers with any pension connected to
their job has fallen from just over half in 1979 to under 35 percent today. In
MetLife’s 2014 survey of employees, 40 percent anticipated that their employers
would reduce benefits even further.
The prevailing insecurity is also a consequence of the demise of
labor unions. Fifty years ago, when General Motors was the largest employer in
America, the typical GM worker earned $35 an hour in today’s dollars. By 2014,
America’s largest employer was Walmart, and the typical entry-level Walmart
worker earned about $9 an hour.
This does not mean the typical GM employee a half-century ago
was “worth” four times what the typical Walmart employee in 2014 was worth. The
GM worker was not better educated or motivated than the Walmart worker. The
real difference was that GM workers a half-century ago had a strong union
behind them that summoned the collective bargaining power of all autoworkers to
get a substantial share of company revenues for its members.
And because more than a third of workers across America belonged to a labor union, the bargains those unions struck with employers raised the wages and benefits of non-unionized workers as well. Non-union firms knew they would be unionized if they did not come close to matching the union contracts.
And because more than a third of workers across America belonged to a labor union, the bargains those unions struck with employers raised the wages and benefits of non-unionized workers as well. Non-union firms knew they would be unionized if they did not come close to matching the union contracts.
Today’s Walmart workers do not have a union to negotiate a
better deal. They are on their own. And because less than 7 percent of today’s
private-sector workers are unionized, most employers across America do not have
to match union contracts. This puts unionized firms at a competitive
disadvantage. Public policies have enabled and encouraged this fundamental
change.
More states have adopted so-called “right-to-work” laws. The National Labor Relations Board, understaffed and overburdened, has barely enforced collective bargaining. When workers have been harassed or fired for seeking to start a union, the board rewards them back pay—a mere slap on the wrist of corporations that have violated the law. The result has been a race to the bottom.
More states have adopted so-called “right-to-work” laws. The National Labor Relations Board, understaffed and overburdened, has barely enforced collective bargaining. When workers have been harassed or fired for seeking to start a union, the board rewards them back pay—a mere slap on the wrist of corporations that have violated the law. The result has been a race to the bottom.
Given these changes in the organization of the market, it is not
surprising that corporate profits have increased as a portion of the total
economy, while wages have declined. Those whose income derives directly or
indirectly from profits—corporate executives, Wall Street traders, and
shareholders—have done exceedingly well. Those dependent primarily on wages
have not.
V
The underlying problem, then, is not that most Americans are
“worth” less in the market than they had been, or that they have been living
beyond their means. Nor is it that they lack enough education to be
sufficiently productive. The more basic problem is that the market itself has
become tilted ever more in the direction of moneyed interests that have exerted
disproportionate influence over it, while average workers have steadily lost
bargaining power—both economic and political—to receive as large a portion of
the economy’s gains as they commanded in the first three decades after World
War II.
As a result, their means have not kept up with what the economy could otherwise provide them.
As a result, their means have not kept up with what the economy could otherwise provide them.
To attribute this to the impersonal workings of the “free
market” is to disregard the power of large corporations and the financial
sector, which have received a steadily larger share of economic gains as a
result of that power. As their gains have continued to accumulate, so has their
power to accumulate even more.
Under these circumstances, education is no panacea.
Reversing the scourge of widening inequality requires reversing the upward distributions
within the rules of the market, and giving workers the bargaining leverage they
need to get a larger share of the gains from growth. Yet neither will be
possible as long as large corporations and Wall Street have the power to
prevent such a restructuring.
And as they, and the executives and managers who run them, continue to collect the lion’s share of the income and wealth generated by the economy, their influence over the politicians, administrators, and judges who determine the rules of the game may be expected to grow.
And as they, and the executives and managers who run them, continue to collect the lion’s share of the income and wealth generated by the economy, their influence over the politicians, administrators, and judges who determine the rules of the game may be expected to grow.
The answer to this conundrum is not found in economics. It is
found in politics. The changes in the organization of the economy have been
reinforcing and cumulative: As more of the nation’s income flows to large
corporations and Wall Street and to those whose earnings and wealth derive
directly from them, the greater is their political influence over the rules of
the market, which in turn enlarges their share of total income.
The more dependent politicians become on their financial favors,
the greater is the willingness of such politicians and their appointees to
reorganize the market to the benefit of these moneyed interests. The weaker
unions and other traditional sources of countervailing power become
economically, the less able they are to exert political influence over the
rules of the market, which causes the playing field to tilt even further
against average workers and the poor.
Ultimately, the trend toward widening inequality in America, as
elsewhere, can be reversed only if the vast majority, whose incomes have
stagnated and whose wealth has failed to increase, join together to demand
fundamental change.
The most important political competition over the next decades will not be between the right and left, or between Republicans and Democrats. It will be between a majority of Americans who have been losing ground, and an economic elite that refuses to recognize or respond to its growing distress.
The most important political competition over the next decades will not be between the right and left, or between Republicans and Democrats. It will be between a majority of Americans who have been losing ground, and an economic elite that refuses to recognize or respond to its growing distress.
ROBERT B. REICH, Chancellor’s Professor of
Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley and Senior Fellow at
the Blum Center for Developing Economies, was Secretary of Labor in the Clinton
administration. Time Magazine named him one of the ten most effective cabinet
secretaries of the twentieth century. He has written thirteen books, including
the best sellers “Aftershock" and “The Work of Nations." His latest,
"Beyond Outrage," is now out in paperback. He is also a founding
editor of the American Prospect magazine and chairman of Common Cause. His new
film, "Inequality for All," is now available on Netflix, iTunes, DVD,
and On Demand.