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U.S.
Supreme Court
Argued December 6, 1904
Decided
February 20, 1905
197
U.S. 11
Syllabus
The
United States does not derive any of its substantive powers from the Preamble
of the Constitution. It cannot exert any power to secure the declared objects
of the Constitution unless, apart from the Preamble, such power be found in, or
can properly be implied from, some express delegation in the instrument.
While
the spirit of the Constitution is to be respected not less than its letter, the
spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.
While
the exclusion of evidence in the state court in a case involving the
constitutionality of a state statute may not strictly present a Federal
question, this court may consider the rejection of such evidence upon the
ground of incompetency or immateriality under the statute as showing its scope
and meaning in the opinion of the state court.
The
police power of a State embraces such reasonable regulations relating to
matters completely within its territory, and not affecting the people of other
States, established directly by legislative enactment, as will protect the
public health and safety.
While
a local regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police power of a State,
must always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the General
Government of any power it possesses under the Constitution, the mode or manner
of exercising its police power is wholly within the discretion of the State so
long as the Constitution of the United States is not contravened, or any right
granted or secured thereby is not infringed, or not exercised in such an
arbitrary and oppressive manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent wrong and oppression.
The
liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States does not import an
absolute right in each person to be at all times, and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint, nor is it an element in such liberty that one
person, or a minority of persons residing in any community and enjoying the
benefits of its local government, should have power to dominate the majority
when supported in their action by the authority of the State.
It
is within the police power of a State to enact a compulsory vaccination law,
and it is for the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine in the
first instance whether vaccination is or is not the best mode for the
prevention of smallpox and the protection of the public health.
There being obvious reasons for such exception, the fact that children, under certain circumstances, are excepted from the operation of the law does not deny the equal protection of the laws to adults if the statute is applicable equally to all adults in like condition.
The
highest court of Massachusetts not having held that the compulsory vaccination
law of that State establishes the absolute rule that an adult must be
vaccinated even if he is not a fit subject at the time or that vaccination
would seriously injure his health or cause his death, this court holds that, as
to an adult residing in the community, and a fit subject of vaccination, the
statute is not invalid as in derogation of any of the rights of such person
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This
case involves the validity, under the Constitution of the United States, of
certain provisions in the statutes of Massachusetts relating to vaccination.
The
Revised Laws of that Commonwealth, c. 75, § 137, provide that
"the board of health of a city or town if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit five dollars."
An
exception is made in favor of "children who present a certificate, signed
by a registered physician that they are unfit subjects for vaccination." §
139.
Proceeding
under the above statutes, the Board of Health of the city of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, on the twenty-seventh day of February, 1902, adopted the
following regulation:
"Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge and still continues to increase; and whereas it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated, and whereas, in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1, 1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated."
Subsequently,
the Board adopted an additional regulation empowering a named physician to
enforce the vaccination of persons as directed by the Board at its special
meeting of February 27.
The
above regulations being in force, the plaintiff in error, Jacobson, was
proceeded against by a criminal complaint in one of the inferior courts of
Massachusetts. The complaint charged that, on the seventeenth day of July,
1902, the Board of Health of Cambridge, being of the opinion that it was
necessary for the public health and safety, required the vaccination and
revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof who had not been successfully
vaccinated since the first day of March, 1897, and provided them with the means
of free vaccination, and that the defendant, being over twenty-one years of age
and not under guardianship, refused and neglected to comply with such
requirement.
The
defendant, having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty. The government put in
evidence the above regulations adopted by the Board of Health, and made proof
tending to show that its chairman informed the defendant that, by refusing to
be vaccinated, he would incur the penalty provided by the statute, and would be
prosecuted therefor; that he offered to vaccinate the defendant without expense
to him, and that the offer was declined, and defendant refused to be
vaccinated.
The
prosecution having introduced no other evidence, the defendant made numerous
offers of proof. But the trial court ruled that each and all of the facts
offered to be proved by the defendant were immaterial, and excluded all proof
of them.
The
defendant, standing upon his offers of proof and introducing no evidence, asked
numerous instructions to the jury, among which were the following:
That section 137 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, and tended to subvert and defeat the purposes of the Constitution as declared in its Preamble;
That
the section referred to was in derogation of the rights secured to the
defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
and especially of the clauses of that amendment providing that no State shall
make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws; and
That
said section was opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.
Each
of the defendant's prayers for instructions was rejected, and he duly excepted.
The defendant requested the court, but the court refused, to instruct the jury
to return a verdict of not guilty. And the court instructed the jury, in
substance, that, if they believed the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth
and were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of
the offense charged in the complaint, they would be warranted in finding a verdict
of guilty. A verdict of guilty was thereupon returned.
The case was then continued for the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That court overruled all the defendant's exceptions, sustained the action of the trial court, and thereafter, pursuant to the verdict of the jury, he was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of five dollars. And the court ordered that he stand committed until the fine was paid.
